The Impersonal is Personal: Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women through the Lens of Roberto Esposito’s Third Person by Windsor, Claire
Western University
Scholarship@Western
2015 Undergraduate Awards The Undergraduate Awards
2015
The Impersonal is Personal: Missing and Murdered
Indigenous Women through the Lens of Roberto
Esposito’s Third Person
Claire Windsor
Western University, cwindso@uwo.ca
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/ungradawards_2015
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Gender and Sexuality Commons,
Inequality and Stratification Commons, Political Science Commons, and the Race and Ethnicity
Commons
Recommended Citation
Windsor, Claire, "The Impersonal is Personal: Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women through the Lens of Roberto Esposito’s
Third Person" (2015). 2015 Undergraduate Awards. 18.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/ungradawards_2015/18
 Abstract: 
 
This essay explores the issue of Missing and Murdered Women (MMIW) in Canada from 
a perspective that problematizes not only the racializing and gendering of indigenous women, but 
the normative conception of the human ascribed to settler Canadians as well. By examining these 
processes as part of a greater juridical-biological constitution of ‘the human,’ the ways in which 
this differentiation works to valorize the lives of some humans whilst simultaneously devaluing 
the lives of ‘others’ are revealed. This hierarchy is explored through the lens of Roberto 
Esposito’s book Third Person in order to illustrate how the subject-formations that have occurred 
and continue to occur at the intersection of Canada’s indigenous and settler populations stem 
from problematic notions of personhood. Inspired by Esposito’s problematization of both secular 
and Catholic notions of personhood, this essay discusses and critiques the ways in which these 
notions, in the form of the colonial and settler state dispositif, have contributed to the devaluation 
of indigenous peoples, cultures, sovereignty and bodies and simultaneous overvaluation of their 
non-indigenous counter-parts in the specific context of the phenomenon of MMIW. In response 
to Esposito’s proposed affirmative biopolitics, this essay concludes by proposing a way out of 
this dispositif, inspired by the work of Judith Butler and Walter Mignolo, through a “universal 
project of diversality” premised on the shared precariousness of life. 
 
 
The Impersonal is Personal: Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women through the Lens of 
Roberto Esposito’s Third Person 
 
Even in my disconnection from song, from dance, 
I am not tragic 
Even in seeing you as privileged, 
As an occupier of my homeland in my homeless state 
Even as men abduct as I hitchhike along these new highways 
To disappear along this lonely colonial road 
I refuse to be tragic (Maracle in Kino-nda-niimi Collective, 2014, p.216) 
 
The phenomenon of Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women (MMIW) has been at the 
forefront of Canada’s national dialogue in recent years and in various forms from calls for a 
national inquiry and condemnation of Canada’s ongoing human rights abuses to greater policing 
of inter-community violence, harsh sentences for offenders, and healing from past abuses. What 
these rights-based, decolonial, or identity-based approaches have thus far been unable to grasp 
are the ways in which the gendered and racialized lives of Indigenous women are differentiated 
and thus devalued in relation to a supposed norm of the  ‘person’. The processes that distribute 
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and normalize valuations of human lives operate at the intersection of Indigenous and settler 
existence and, as this essay will examine, have worked to create and sustain not only the 
conditions under which the phenomenon of MMIW has occurred, but also the way it is dealt with 
and perceived.  
Inspired by Roberto Esposito’s deconstruction of the “dispositif of the person,” and his 
subsequent attempt to outline an affirmative biopolitics, this essay will deconstruct the specific 
juridical-biological constitution of the person that racialized and gendered Indigenous women are 
differentiated from and which has supported the conditions under which the phenomenon of 
MMIW has occurred. This will be followed by a discussion of the ways in which the lives of 
individuals who have been victims of violence have been apprehended in the processes of 
recognition, grievability, and reparative justice. This section will be premised on the inherent 
inability of such processes to conceive of the totality of human life. This is mirrored by the 
simultaneous inability of current ethical dispositions to undo the ontology of the settler state to 
the degree required to bridge “the still dramatically gaping chasm between the concept of human 
being and that of citizen” (Esposito, 2012, p.3). I will then examine Esposito’s own attempt at an 
affirmative biopolitics by way of the category of the impersonal. While a vital step beyond the 
unpolitical, Esposito’s positioning simply does not provide for the type of emancipatory politics 
required to replace the existing dispositif of the person. The final section of this essay will use 
the work of Walter Mignolo and Judith Butler to propose a way out of this dispositif through a 
“universal project of diversality” premised on the shared precariousness of life (Mignolo, 2011, 
p.235). 
Expanding upon the work of Socrates and Plato, Aristotle asserted that while humans 
share their nutritive and instinctual life with plants (bios) and animals (zoē) respectively, the 
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ability of man to be rational elevates him above those more simplistic forms of life (Aristotle in 
Reale, 1990, p.320). This notion of ‘man’ being composed of a hierarchy of differentiated life is 
central to what Esposito refers to as “the dispositif of the person,” meaning the real effects 
produced by the simultaneous identification of the person with its body and elevation of the 
person above its body through the invocation of sovereignty (Esposito, 2012, p.9, 90; Rancière, 
2004, p.299; Russell, 2014, p.214). As Esposito notes, this dispositif is “based on the assumed 
continuously recurring separation between person as an artificial entity and the human as a 
natural being, whom the status of person may or may not benefit” (2012, p.9). The condition of 
the slave in Roman law exemplifies such a separation, as slaves were essentially trapped in a 
constant struggle between the status of person and thing, like a poor swimmer caught in river 
rapids able to see both shores and perhaps come close to one but never able to escape the current 
(ibid). 
Christian philosophy has a similar notion of the not-quite human as seen in the 
jurisprudence developed by the Holy Roman Church to deal with Saracens, who we would now 
consider Arab-Muslims (Vauchez, 2005). In order to justify the Church’s wars with these 
peoples, Saracens were characterized as heathens, idolatrous pagan warriors, and servants of the 
devil thus rendering them inherently incapable of waging a just war (ibid; Anghie, 1996, p.323, 
329). The waging of just war was reserved for Christians because Christianity was considered 
the only path to redemption for the original sin that cast each individual as guilty, “regardless of 
the personal intent or actions involved” (Short, 2013, p.147). Therefore, as inherently guilty 
peoples the normal principles of just war did not apply to the Saracens, which meant that acts 
like the seizure of goods and enslavement of women and children were justifiable in the eyes of 
the Church (Anghie, 1996, p.330).  
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The refusal of Christian jurisprudence to recognize non-Christians as humans with 
equally valuable lives to theirs is the basis for much of colonial thinking, particularly the 
thinking of Francisco de Vitoria whose work justified the initial colonization of the Indigenous 
people of North America and is considered foundational to international law. Despite the 
overwhelming influence of Christian jurisprudence, Vitoria initially attempted to create a new 
system of international law based on natural, not divine law, to be managed by a secular 
sovereign, instead of the Pope (Anghie, 1996, p.323). This system of jus gentium was premised 
upon Vitoria’s recognition of Indigenous peoples as human and in possession of reason; it was 
precisely because of this rationality that Vitoria argued they were bound to jus gentium (Anghie, 
1996, p.325). While he did consider both Spaniards and the Natives to be human, he conceived 
of them as being part of two different orders on a cultural basis, laying the philosophical 
foundation for racialized laws that continue today in the form of Canada’s Indian Act (ibid).  
The notion that Native societies require management in the form of federal oversight 
despite their shared human status resulted from Vitoria’s universalization of Spanish cultural 
practices and values into the framework and subsequent norms of the jus gentium system 
(Anghie, 1996, p.326). The consequence was a situation not unlike that of the Saracens and the 
Holy Roman Church, except in this case the laws that were inevitably violated by Indigenous 
peoples were purported to be secular, rational, and natural. Esposito locates the turning point of 
biopolitics in the late 1800s, early 1900s, with the “transfer of the dual-life principle from the 
sphere of the single living being to that of the human species as a whole, which now appeared to 
be split into two juxtaposed areas of unequal value, and hence endowed with a different right to 
survival” (2012, p.7). While this was undoubtedly the period in which the dispositif of the person 
became solidified across disciplines, most notably in science, it must not be forgotten that the 
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“point of division within humanity, between species of people who were separated by their 
relation to life – and thus to death,” was established into law and society far earlier (ibid). 
The second part of Esposito’s quote immediately above, that “the easy life for some 
turned out to be directly proportional to the forced death of others,” once again applies to the 
Canadian case, particularly with regards to European expansion (Esposito, 2012, p.7). It is vital 
to state here that, “the forced death of others” need not be limited to physical death, as Andrea 
Smith asserts in her work on sexual violence and the American Indian genocide that, “sexual 
violence…encompasses a wide range of strategies designed not only to destroy peoples, but to 
destroy their sense of being a people” (Smith, 2005, p.3). 
Despite Vitoria’s contribution to international jurisprudence, much of the pre-nineteenth 
century relationships between Indigenous nations and Britain were relatively amicable due to the 
U.K.’s reliance on them as economic and military allies, however this quickly came to an end 
with the decline of the fur trade and end of hostilities with America (Douglas, 2002, p.2). 
Hereafter the desire for the expansion of settler society, to which Indigenous populations were 
considered an impediment—particularly Indigenous women as bearers of future generations—
led to the establishment of reserves and the creation of legal definitions of “Indian” that would 
determine entitlement to land (ibid).  This drastic policy shift has proven essential to the 
narrative of the Canadian nation-state. As Smith notes, “…the colonized must seem to partially 
resemble the colonists in order to reinforce the dominant ideology…However, the colonized 
group can never be completely assimilated – otherwise they would be equal to the colonists, and 
there would be no reason to colonize them” (2005, p.26).  
It is through the Indian Act’s gendered definitions of ‘Indian’ that the process of the legal 
disenfranchisement of Indigenous women began. Under the 1876 definition, women could only 
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be ‘Indian’ if they were married to an ‘Indian’ man, a definition that remained for over 100 years 
until the passage of Bill C-31 in 1985 (Douglas, 2002, p.2). The legal destruction of the 
matriarchal social system of many First Nations continues to have devastating effects on 
Indigenous individuals and societies as a whole. Darlene Ritchie gave a particularly stark 
example of this in her presentation The Indian Act and Our Current Epidemic. Ritchie is Oneida 
but married a Saugeen man and because of the Indian Act is no longer allowed to live on Oneida 
land. Therefore, Ritchie was just one of many young women forced to move far away from their 
families, friends and cultural heritage, to an unfamiliar community and situation (2015). The 
systematic separation of Indigenous peoples from their land and therefore their culture was 
central to the Indian Residential School System and continues today through the uneven 
distribution of public goods like education and healthcare, as well as the much maligned child 
welfare system. These were all contributing factors to the death of fifteen-year-old Tina 
Fontaine, whose body was found in Winnipeg’s Red River on August 17, 2014, just weeks 
before she was meant to start the tenth grade (CBC News, 2014; Hunt, 2014). That the lives of 
Indigenous women continue to be accounted for primarily in terms of their involvement with 
government agencies, rather than as individuals deserving of respect and dignity provides yet 
another example of how racialized and gendered processes of recognition work to force certain 
human lives outside the designation of personhood, exposing them to violence. 
It is with this notion of exposure in mind that I turn now to Judith Butler’s work 
Precarious Life, Grievable Life and her discussion of the normative schemes that, “our very 
capacity to discern and name the ‘being’ of the subject [are] dependent on” (2009, p. 4-5). These 
allow members of settler society to be treated as subjects with the ability to act while the lives of 
Indigenous women are apprehended as objects to be acted upon. In Canada these normative 
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schemes have developed throughout our colonial history in such a way as to “maximize 
precariousness for some,” in this case Indigenous women, “and minimize precariousness for 
others,” meaning the settler society (ibid, p.2-3). A central feature of the norms framing the (lack 
of) subjectivity of Indigenous women is the colonization of sexual agency. As Smith’s work 
points out, the impunity towards Native women who have gone missing or been murdered is 
largely to do with the fact that a high proportion of these women are or have been sex workers, 
many of whom have experienced homelessness (2011, p.258). These conditions are related to the 
fact that “in Canada, 42.7% of Aboriginal women live in poverty, double the percentage of non-
Aboriginal women and significantly more than the number of Aboriginal men” (Jacobs and 
Williams, 2008, p.128). While there is not sufficient space here to discuss the specific acts of 
colonial violence, like the Indian Residential Schools and the Sixties Scoop, that contribute to 
such conditions, From Truth to Reconciliation: Transforming the Legacy of Residential Schools 
provides a good description of these policies from a number of perspectives, while Lee 
Maracle’s I Am Woman provides a vital glimpse into the lived experiences of Indigenous women 
and men affected by these policies. 
Individuals living in periods of homelessness or working in the sex trade have long been 
cast out by ‘mainstream society’ however the violence experienced by Indigenous women in 
such situations is compounded by a history of mutilation, sterilization and ascription of an 
inherent impurity to their bodies (Smith, 2011, p.253). The overwhelming preoccupation of 
settler society with the management of Indigenous women’s bodies, whether in terms of 
violation or preservation, is demonstrative of the dispositif of the person in that their lives are 
only apprehended in terms of their animality, or zoē. Nowhere are these tendencies clearer than 
in the case of Cindy Gladue, a 36 year old Cree woman, mother and sex worker who was 
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horrifyingly dehumanized at the hands of both her killer, Bradley Barton, and the Canadian legal 
system (Hunt, 2015). In its attempt to seek justice for the death of Ms. Gladue, the Crown 
displayed her preserved pelvis to the jury as evidence, thus centering the trial on the 11-
centimetre injury to her vagina, rather than the injury to her as a person (DiManno, 2015). While 
trials for murder, assault, and other crimes are by nature invasive, the unprecedented display of a 
victim’s body part is intimately connected to her status as a female Indigenous sex worker (Big 
Canoe, 2015). This is demonstrative of the fact that, as Smith asserts, “…issues of colonial, race 
and gender oppression cannot be separated” (2011, p.253). As in the case of Cindy Gladue, these 
issues tend to be either dismissed or co-opted by settler society in an effort to maintain the 
exclusive and immunizing conception of the person on which modern forms of community are 
modeled (Short, 2013, p.143).  
 This inability of modern forms of community to recognize the lives of Indigenous women 
as having the same value as settler individuals is in part an effect of the fact that recognisability 
“is not a quality or potential of individual humans,” that it is distributed differentially in 
accordance with norms like those discussed above (Butler, 2009, p.6). Esposito locates this 
border between possible and real lives in the category of ‘haecceity,’ that which designates 
something’s individuality (2012, p.148-149). In this case, the haecceity is the category of the 
person that splits humans into life and subject, a split that must be maintained by the constant 
(re)assertion of norms by which lives can be differentiated (ibid). Maintenance of this border is 
required for those on the inside to make sense of themselves and must be continuous because of 
the precarious, temporal nature of what it is attempting to divide (Butler, 2009, p.10). 
 One key effect produced by this structure of personhood is identified by Butler as 
grievability, “a presupposition for the life that matters” (2009, p.14). Through her assertion of 
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precarity as “a shared condition of human life,” the degree to which the loss of such life is 
grievable is a marker of the hierarchy of life from anthropos to humanitas or in this case from 
“Indian” to “person”—from one who is governed in accordance with their racialized and 
gendered status to one whose humanity is recognized, celebrated and deemed worthy of 
protection (ibid, p.14-15).  
This notion of grievability is particularly salient in relation to the phenomenon of MMIW 
and the varying responses to the crisis. As Butler notes, “forms of racism [and sexism] instituted 
and active at the level of perception tend to produce iconic versions of populations who are 
eminently grievable, and others whose loss is no loss, and who remain ungrievable” (ibid, p.24). 
While I would argue that the racism and sexism aimed at Indigenous women in Canada goes 
beyond the level of perception, the notion of an iconic and therefore grievable version of 
Indigenous womanhood can be seen in the tendency of Canadian media to report exclusively on 
those MMIW who occupy the role of mother or daughter. These categories of relational 
identification are utilized in order to cross that border of personhood; it is primarily because 
settler society is able to recognize value in the shared concepts of mother and daughter that those 
whose lives would normally not be grievable may become so. In addition, Kristen Gilchrist’s 
work exploring the differences in Canadian local press coverage of MMIW and white women 
illustrates how the racialization and gendering of lives works to diminish their value (2010).  
While much of the above is familiar or at least understandable to those who share the 
outrage and sadness that surrounds the phenomenon of MMIW, Carmen Murdocca’s work on 
Indigenous self-harm and suicide raises some important questions regarding calls for an inquiry 
and other potential solutions that dominate the conversation in settler society. Murdocca’s 
exploration of the issue of self-harm and suicide as a part of “reparation politics” points to the 
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creation of “a legitimate framework for the development of humanitarian and compassionate 
strategies that support the reparative aspiration of the liberal state,” through the frameworks of 
persistence and memorialisation that have characterised “the problem of suicide” (2013, p.94). 
While there are calls for an inquiry from both settler and Indigenous groups, Murdocca cautions 
against the ability of such tools to transform the settler state’s relationship to Indigenous peoples, 
particularly as it connotes an alteration in, rather than a shift away from, the concentration of 
“biopolitical and necropolitical forms of governance” in the hands of the settler state (2013, 
p.97). Not only would such a mechanism reinforce the power and legitimacy of the settler state, 
it would also further cement the dispositif of the person into ‘legitimate’ forms of ethics despite 
the fact that, as noted in the first section of the essay, this dispositif was instrumental in the 
creation of the conditions under which the phenomenon of MMIW is possible. 
The second vital point to be gathered from Murdocca’s work is the way in which 
“contemporary colonial inquires” like the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on Indian 
Residential Schools and potential inquiry into MMIW, can work to obscure the overwhelming 
contribution of histories of colonial governance to everyday violence (2013, p.97-98). The most 
recent example of this is the RCMP’s publication of statistics noting that 70% of the solved 
murders of Aboriginal women in Canada were committed by people of Aboriginal descent 
(Paris, 2015). While this statistic is not particularly surprising given that this 70% statistic is the 
same across all ethnicities, the race-based ascription of guilt works to obscure the colonial roots 
of such inter-personal violence (ibid). Lee Maracle describes the pain and violence in the 
struggle to love both oneself and one another as a result of such colonial violence: 
I am torn apart and terrorized, not by you my love, but by the war 
waging inside me. A new torment grips me for I know the battle will grow 
in intensity until my desire to love you without the need to use you prevails. 
As the war grows, so grows my madness. 
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I have no right to expect patience or ask you to carry on loving me in the 
face of madness. I do not ask you to forgive my behaviour nor do I expect you to 
forget. Secretly, passionately, I want you to help the patriot inside me win. Now you 
will be watchful, wary, waiting for my hysteria—the expression of internal war. Just 
as I am on guard against your anger, you watch for my hysteria. We are a pair of 
suspicious fools (1996, p.32). 
 
This passage provides a far underrepresented glimpse into the lived experiences of Indigenous 
peoples in a settler state and allows for a much greater understanding of the “everyday violence” 
referred to by Murdocca (2013, p.97). Maracle’s deeply personal writing works to reinsert 
meaning into the everyday lives and deaths of individuals in direct contrast to the depravation of 
meaning enacted by racial and gendered formations. Listening to the stories and the voices of 
Indigenous women is central to combating the notion that the phenomenon of MMIW is a state 
of exception, distinct and separate from hundreds of years of racialized and gendered colonial 
violence. 
The value of such decolonial, re-politicized voices is precisely what is missing from 
Esposito’s attempts to address the inability of modern ontologies to escape modes of recognition 
that privilege those in possession of specific, temporal identities rather than the value in life itself 
through his notion of the impersonal. I use the term “re-politicized” above in order to 
differentiate from the existing forms of politicization that function in accordance with the 
dispositif of the person, “[separating] the whole of the community from itself,” which Esposito 
makes a point of avoiding. Russell refers to Esposito’s philosophy of the impersonal as 
belonging to Rancière’s category of ethical dissensus which disrupts “accepted ways of making 
sense (sens) of what is given in the world around us (sens),” by invoking the law of a figure of 
radical incomprehensibility (Russell, 2014, p.218-219). While such a dissensus of the person is 
vital for the creation of an affirmative bipolitics that Esposito calls for, his work stops short of 
providing even a hint of what such a politics would look like, yielding what Short describes as 
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“an unstructured, unlimited affirmation of an ontological ‘drift’ that complicates but never poses 
an alternative” (Short, 2013, p.146). The importance of Esposito’s work to a more holistic 
understanding of the phenomenon of MMIW is clear from the discussions of the role of the 
dispositif of the person in the processes of creation, maintenance and management that occur at 
the intersection of Indigenous and settler societies. Despite this, and in consideration of 
Murdocca’s cautions against the fetishization of MMIW, Esposito’s philosophy offers no 
direction to those seeking an alternative ethics that is able to recognize the implicit value of a life 
(Murdocca, 2013, p.96). 
In light of this, I would like to put forth a possibility for an alternative ethics, building on 
the work of Butler, and Rancière, as well as notions of decoloniality (Esposito, 2012, p.74-75). 
Butler’s call for recognition of the shared precariousness of life is vital to this endeavour because 
of its ability to transcend the unequal distribution of precarity produced through the dispositif of 
the person (2009, p.28-29). While the promotion of such a universalizing principle appears 
contrary to all the deconstructive work above, what differentiates Butler’s notion is its explicit 
recognition that “no conditions can fully solve human precariousness” (ibid, p.30). This notion is 
actually quite similar to Deleuze’s conception of a life, which Esposito refers to as, “what does 
not allow – what contradicts at its roots – the hierarchical division between these two entities 
within a separating dispositif of the person” (Esposito, 2012, p.147).  
Butler’s call for “a movement sheltering certain kinds of ongoing antagonisms among its 
participants, valuing such persistent and animating differences,” which she labels a kind of 
“radical democratic politics,” is echoed in Rancière’s description of democracy as “the power of 
those who have no qualification for exercising power” (Butler, 2009, p.32; Rancière, 2004, 
p.304). While the term democracy, particularly when proposed as a solution by settlers and 
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Europeans, is obviously fraught with negative implications for Indigenous peoples, the type of 
democracy Butler and Rancière refer to is infused with politics of plurality and “the maximal 
inclusion of singularities” (Short, 2013, p.151). It must be noted that many of the suggestions put 
forth for an affirmative biopolitics are already being enacted in local, everyday acts of 
decolonization by Indigenous peoples, as has been seen in the flourishing of Indigenous activism 
since the Idle No More movement (see Leanne Simpson, 2011; and Kino-nda-niimi Collective, 
2014 for more). For the future of these respective efforts at the creation of an alternative ethics, 
more acts of double translation are required in which “forms of knowledge that had been 
discredited from the very inception of modernity/coloniality enter into a double movement of 
‘getting in/letting in’” (Mignolo, 2011, p.222). Central to such efforts is the notion that 
“decolonization is as much a process as a goal,” an inherently optimistic idea that recognizes that 
each one of us has a role to play in the shaping of our families, communities, countries and world 
(Harsha Walia in Kino-nda-niimi Collective, 2014, p.45). 
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